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Introduction 
Paolo Passaglia 
 
I. The Italian Constitution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly in 
1947 and entered into force on 1 January 1948. Today, almost seventy years 
later, Italy has changed considerably: society, the economy, politics and 
international relations have all undergone dramatic evolutions, as well as the 
legal system itself. 
Against this backdrop, the Constitution was amended several times, 
although always with regard to specific provisions. The only major reform was 
adopted in 2001, concerning the Regions (and, to a lesser extent, local 
authorities), the powers of which were strengthened in terms of both 
legislative and executive responsibilities. Other than this reform, it is difficult 
to find pivotal innovations in the constitutional text, to the point that in Italy, 
even the effects of the process of European integration and the changing 
landscape that this has entailed for Member States’ legal orders, was not – at 
least until 2001 – explicitly recognized with constitutional amendments, unlike 
the case of almost all of the other Member States. The membership of the 
European Communities (today, of the European Union) was accompanied 
with and enabled by legal reforms coupled with changes in constitutional 
interpretation, without any reforms affecting the text of the Constitution. 
The opposition between the rather static constitutional text and the 
dynamic system on which the Constitution relies has given rise to the question 
of whether the Constitution should be adapted to the new societal inputs. 
Compared to most other European legal systems, where significant constitutional 
changes (as well as reforms aiming to formally ‘maintain’ the relevance of the 
text) are rather frequently carried out, the Italian rejection of changes appears 
somewhat peculiar. This peculiarity, however, does not necessarily imply an 
obstinate attachment to the past: other ancient and static constitutions – 
among which the United States (US) experience more than any other, of 
course – may easily demonstrate that old texts can perfectly fit modern needs. 
These conflicting views fuel the debate on whether the Italian Constitution 
should be considered a text that requires significant amendments, one that 
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should be subjected only to minor specific changes, or rather that should 
remain in its current form. This debate has been alive at least since the 
beginning of the 1980s, with several attempts to pass major reforms occupying 
the political agenda from time to time, drawing the attention of constitutional 
legal scholars and, occasionally, also of the public. 
 
II. The constitutional referendum held on 4 December 2016 was the 
culminating point of one of the most heated seasons of this longstanding 
debate. 
Several factors contributed to make this referendum a possible turning 
point in Italian constitutional and political history. 
First, the reform that was passed by the Parliament and submitted to the 
people was remarkably ambitious, because it affected almost the entirety of 
the Second Part of the Constitution, concerning the ‘Organization of the 
Republic’. If the reform had been adopted, the 1947 Constitution would have 
changed dramatically, even though the provisions regarding the recognition 
and the protection of rights and freedoms (located mostly in the First Part of 
the Constitution) would have remained unaltered. 
Second, all moments when the people directly expresses its will are 
crucial moments for any democratic system: in this case, the sovereign was 
called upon to decide, for the third time in fifteen years,1 on the contents of the 
Supreme Law of the Land. The choice was obviously of the greatest importance, 
and the decision-making process, resulting in the alternative between a simple 
‘yes’ (approval of the reform) or a simple ‘no’ (its rejection), made it especially 
dramatic and solemn. 
Third, because of the significance of the reform, the centre-left Government 
and, in particular, the President of the Council of Ministers, Matteo Renzi, 
connected the outcome of the referendum to their own destiny. The vote on 
the constitutional reform therefore became also a vote of ‘popular confidence’ 
on Renzi, something that may bring to mind similar events occurring in other 
systems,2 but that was somewhat unprecedented in Italy, because a 
longstanding convention placed all constitutional reforms in the hands of the 
Parliament and only recently (probably since 2001, certainly since 2006) did 
the Government begin to play a significant role in the reform process. 
 
III. The outcome of the referendum was clear: the constitutional reform 
adopted by the Parliament was rejected by an overwhelming popular majority 
 
1 The first time was in 2001, when a referendum was held on the reform mentioned above, 
in the text; the second was in 2006, when a new referendum rejected a wider reform of the 
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of just under sixty per cent of the valid votes cast.3 This outcome had an 
undisputable meaning: the people did not want the Constitution to be changed 
in the manner proposed. This was the stark answer to the question posed to 
the people with the referendum. 
Nevertheless, the referendum also had several other effects, only some of 
which are definite at this stage. One of these is certainly the impact on the 
Government: Renzi resigned a few minutes after the results were announced, 
and a new Government was quickly formed, based on the same political 
coalition of its predecessor but led by Paolo Gentiloni. The essential sameness 
of the coalition could be appreciated only from a theoretical point of view, 
because the referendum campaign and its outcome had deep repercussions 
within the political parties, the Partito democratico (Democratic Party) in 
particular. The Democratic Party is the cornerstone of the coalition supporting 
the former President of the Council of Ministers and his successor; however, it 
suffered from increasing opposition from among its own members, an 
opposition focused on the position to adopt towards the al reform and – even 
more importantly – towards Renzi’s leadership. Consequently, after a very 
tense few weeks, in February 2017, a part of the Democratic Party’s internal 
opposition opted for a breakaway. 
More generally, the entire political landscape was considerably distorted 
by the outcome of the referendum, because the parties’ alliances and prospects 
were linked by the referendum and thus a new equilibrium in the political 
sphere had to be found – one that took into consideration the will expressed 
by the people. The most striking factor of instability was, however, the 
Democratic Party’s internal crisis, that gave rise to the possibility of holding 
political elections before the end of the Government’s ordinary mandate in 
2018. The problem with this idea was that the electoral law passed by the 
Parliament in 2015 had been conceived to elect the Chamber of Deputies (the 
lower parliamentary chamber) within the institutional system as it would have 
resulted pursuant to the proposed constitutional reform. Once the reform was 
rejected, the electoral law was difficult to apply. Moreover, its contents had 
been called into question, because their consistency with the Constitution was 
not quite indisputable: indeed, the Constitutional Court had been called upon 
to deliver a judgment on the issue, and thus a waiting attitude prevailed until 
the Constitutional Court rendered, at the end of January 2016, a declaration of 
unconstitutionality that reshaped the electoral system and at the same time 
suggested that Parliament adopt a new electoral law that would take into 
 
3 Almost nineteen million five hundred thousand voters rejected the reform (fifty-nine point 
eleven per cent), while nearly thirteen million five hundred thousand voters approved it (forty 
point eighty-eight per cent). The turnout (sixty-five point forty-seven per cent) was by far the 
highest compared to Italy’s other constitutional referendums: in 2001, the voter turnout was 
extremely low (thirty-four point ten per cent); in 2006 it was higher, but barely exceeded half of 
the total number of eligible voters (fifty-two point forty-six per cent). 
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account the constitutional and political requirements to ensure stable 
governmental majorities. 
All these aspects led to a seriously confused political landscape that 
overshadowed another key issue deriving from the outcome of the referendum: 
how to interpret the popular will with regard to constitutional reform. In 
particular, the rejection of the proposed constitutional reform did not provide 
any further direction as to whether any other constitutional reform should be 
adopted. In other words, the referendum campaign focused on the ‘Renzi-
Boschi reform’,4 and therefore tended to neglect other possible reforms that 
should or could be proposed as substitutes. 
Now that the Renzi-Boschi reform had been conclusively rejected, this 
issue has become crucial, because it impels a choice between two alternative 
courses of action: preserving the current constitutional framework and opting, 
instead, to reform it. In the latter case, a further question arises regarding 
what should be modified and how the modifications could be drafted and 
eventually adopted. In other words, debate on constitutional reform will 
sooner or later start again. And maybe, after the deadlock resulting from the 
2016 referendum, the issues that remained unsettled will at last be addressed 
and resolved. Over the years, the constitutional reform has increasingly grown 
to resemble Samuel Beckett’s Godot, who is supposed to arrive but never 
actually does. The time has clearly come to establish whether it is worth 
waiting for Godot at all, but also to establish precisely what to expect of him. 
 
IV. Of course, these questions cannot be answered yet; it is nevertheless a 
fact that what happened in Italy during the last few months will play a key role 
in the future of constitutional reform and, more generally, in shaping the 
institutional landscape for the near future. Precisely because of its importance, 
The Italian Law Journal’s Editors-in-Chief found that a focus on the 2016 
constitutional referendum would be of interest, to provide an account and an 
analysis of the context and the outcome of the recent attempt to reform the 
Constitution. 
 
V. This issue is divided into three parts. 
In the first part (titled ‘Constitutional Reform in Italy: Past and Present’), 
Jörg Luther’s analysis of the previous attempts to reform the Constitution 
aims to contextualize this most recent referendum in the history of the Italian 
Republic. Graziella Romeo then explains the main features of the reform that 
was adopted by the Parliament, while the contribution of Giacomo Delledonne 
and Giuseppe Martinico outlines the different positions taken by constitutional 
 
4 Maria Elena Boschi was the Minister for Constitutional Reforms; she was considered the 
main author of the reform and was one of the key figures supporting the ‘yes’ vote in the 
referendum campaign, together with Renzi. 
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legal scholars with regard to the Constitution as it would have resulted following 
the intended reform. Finally, Elettra Stradella draws attention to the aftermath 
of the referendum and the impact of its outcome on the Italian political 
landscape. 
In the second part (‘Views on the Future of Constitutional Reform’), four 
Italian constitutional scholars express their views on the future of the 
Constitution. An issue addressed by all contributors is whether the Constitution 
needs to be changed; and all agree that the system does indeed require at least 
some updating. As noted by Paolo Carrozza, several paradoxes hinder the 
efforts to reform the system. Precisely due to the great difficulties encountered 
in these respects, in Beniamino Caravita’s view, the rejected reform was an 
important chance that should have been seized. What the 2016 referendum 
leaves is a deadlock that, according to Giuseppe Franco Ferrari, will be very 
hard to break. Despite the problems that emerged and the general scepticism 
towards further reforms, this issue must nevertheless be faced; for this 
purpose, Ugo De Siervo proposes a set of provisions that should be modified 
and how these reforms should be carried out. 
In the third part (‘Views from Abroad’), four constitutional scholars, who 
are foreigners or Italians established abroad and who closely follow the 
evolutions of the Italian system, comment the process of constitutional reform 
and the outcome of the referendum from a comparative point of view. All of 
these contributions question the appropriateness of asking the people to 
decide, by means of a referendum, such a technical issue as constitutional 
reform. In this regard, Peter Leyland draws a comparison with the referendum 
held in June 2016 on the United Kingdom’s membership of the European 
Union; in the same vein, Pasquale Pasquino sees, in constitutional referenda, 
both a formal deference to popular sovereignty and a demise of the principle 
of reasonableness. Jason Mazzone, instead, focuses on the impact of the 
rejection of the constitutional reform, and, comparing the Italian and the US 
experiences, expresses the fear that an enduring ‘amendmentphobia’ will be 
the ultimate result of the 2016 referendum. A similar concern is emphasized 
by Dian Schefold, who, although conceding that Italy needs reforms, questions 
whether there is a real need for constitutional reforms. 
 
VI. This Special Issue is being published only four months after the 
constitutional referendum was held, a short publishing timeframe that has 
required considerable effort by the contributors. Therefore, I wish to express 
my sincere gratitude to them all, for having accepted to contribute an article, 
for having delivered their papers on time, and – above all – for having drafted 
papers that match the editor’s requests perfectly. As the editor, this of course 
means that I must be considered responsible for any inadequacies that 
readers may find in this issue. 
2017]                           Introduction                                                                   6 
I also wish to extend my thanks to the publisher, the referees and the 
entire staff of The Italian Law Journal, whose hard work, carried out with 
great commitment, minimized the time required to publish the issue. 
Last but not least, a final word of appreciation goes to The Italian Law 
Journal’s Editors-in-Chief, for granting me the task and the privilege to edit 
this issue and for their continuous support. 
 
